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THE REVOLUTION IN LANDLORD-TENANT
LAW: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
VIEW
Veil K Komesar4
Professor Rabin presents an ambitious paper with many facets.' I
would like to focus on two of the subjects he discusses: his evaluation of
the changes in landlord-tenant law and his explanation for rent control
laws. My interest in these subjects does not stem from any strong con-
clusions I hold either supporting or refuting those of Professor Rabin. In
fact, these contexts do not easily yield strong conclusions. I am inter-
ested in the analysis employed by Professor Rabin and others in these
areas. In particular, I feel that many legal and economic analyses suffer
from a failure to consider and compare basic institutional features as
part of either descriptive or prescriptive inquiry. This is a theme I have
sounded in criticism of Posnerian law and economics 2 and will raise in
consideration of constitutional analysis. 3 I would like to take this oppor-
tunity to briefly follow it out in the landlord-tenant area.
I
EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL REFORMS
First, I will consider Professor Rabin's evaluation of the revolution
in landlord-tenant law. More exactly, I would like to examine the ana-
lytical tools and assumptions that underlie this evaluation. He begins
with the conventional law and economics format: given competition in
the industry, "a laissez-faire policy will normally obtain maximum effi-
ciency in the use of economic resources."'4 He then goes on to look at
"well-known exceptions" to this general rule.5 The exceptions, such as
those based on concern for social cost, consist of a partial list of market
(or laissez-faire) "failures."
My major problem with this analysis is its preoccupation with the
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B. 1963, A.M. 1964, J.D.
1967, Ph.D. 1973, University of Chicago.
I Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 517 (1984).
2 Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Anaysis: A Comparative Institutional
Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981).
3 Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously-Introduction to A Strategyfor ConstitutionalAnalysis,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming).
4 Rabin, supra note 1, at 578.
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attributes of the market and, in turn, its failure to adequately consider
and compare the attributes of other imperfect societal institutions. But
before expanding on this comparative institutional theme, it seems use-
ful to briefly consider another analytical ommission-Professor Rabin's
apparent assumption that the sole criterion for social welfare in this con-
text is resource allocation efficiency.
I am uncertain why Professor Rabin has focused on allocative ef-
fects to the exclusion of distributive ones. He begins the evaluation sec-
tion by stating that the primary purpose of the changes in the landlord-
tenant law is to improve the position of tenants, primarily poor tenants.
That goal seems distinct from general resource allocation efficiency. Yet
he never evaluates the changes in landlord-tenant law in terms of this
criterion. Perhaps he is convinced that redistributive effects simply will
not occur. Thus, if all the incidents of the additional costs are eventu-
ally passed on to tenants, there are no redistributive effects. In that case,
an analysis concerned with the interests of tenants could ignore issues of
redistribution.
I do not think, however, that the absence of distributive effects has
been established and that, therefore, redistributive goals can be ignored
analytically. Approximately ten years ago, I responded to a long article
by Professor Bruce Ackerman in which he attempted to establish ease of
redistribution based, in part, on the limited likelihood that the costs of
code enforcement would be passed on to the tenants.6 Indeed, Judge
Skelly Wright employed the Ackerman article for such a proposition in
one of his important landlord-tenant opinions.7 It was Professor Acker-
man's analysis, not his conclusions, which concerned me. I had no
strong view on whether the enforcement of housing codes through land-
lord-tenant law would aid or harm tenants or who would pay. Nor did I
suggest that housing code enforcement was obviously an inferior alter-
native mode of achieving redistribution (a concern of Professor Acker-
man) or economic efficiency (a goal often associated with the economic
analysis of law). My argument was only that it was not so obviously
superior and costless as Professor Ackerman would have had his readers
believe.
The incidence of a tax or a government-required expenditure is a
complex determination. Highly competitive markets do not indicate
that the incidences will fall solely on consumers. As far as I can deter-
mine from Professor Rabin's description of the literature, no one has
adequately shown the extent to which tenants rather than landlords (or
6 Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforce-
ment and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175 (1973) (critiquing Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing
Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Poliy,
80 YALE LJ. 1093 (1971)).
7 Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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indeed various other parties involved in providing rental housing)
would bear these costs. Professor Ackerman and Judge Wright were
wrong to the extent that they believed that it was obvious that tenants
in general, and low income tenants in particular, would not bear any of
these costs. To my knowledge, however, the opposite proposition has
not been established. As such, the goal of income redistribution remains
a plausible concern in the landlord-tenant context and one that Profes-
sor Rabin ought not have ignored.
But the feature of Professor Rabin's analysis that is the most troub-
ling and, in turn, most intellectually interesting, is the skewed nature of
the analytics he employs-his incomplete institutional analysis. Al-
though my commentary will point to the incompleteness of Professor
Rabin's analysis, it is not meant to suggest that Professor Rabin stands
alone in these failings. Indeed, when Professor Rabin focuses on varia-
tion in market attributes as the controlling feature, he is in good com-
pany. Posnerian law and economics suffers from the same form of
institutional myopia on both prescriptive and descriptive levels. In a
recent article, I argued that the economic analysis of the common law
evolved by Professor Richard Posner focuses almost exclusively on varia-
tion in the ability of the market to make valuations that provide effi-
cient results: when the market works well, common law judges defer to
the market; when it does not work well, the judiciary assumes the valua-
tion function. 8 Even if one assumes that economic efficiency is the goal
of the common law, such an institutional approach is intrinsically in-
complete. Variation in the attributes of one alternative yields little of
value without regard to parallel variation in the attributes of other alter-
natives over the relevant range. Thus, that the market is more or less
perfect means nothing unless we have some idea about the relative abil-
ity of the relevant alternative allocative mechanisms. Although the ju-
diciary is often the alternative in the Posnerian examples, Professor
Posner fails to consider carefully whether as the market varies in its allo-
cative abilities the judiciary also varies. Professor Posner yields solutions
that are apparently determinative, but the appearance is illusory. The
institutional configuration is more complex and the intellectual task
richer and more difficult than the Posnerian analysis suggests.
So it is with Professor Rabin's analysis of these changes in landlord-
tenant law. Consider first, resource allocation and the implied warran-
ties of habitability. Professor Rabin suggests that when the courts pro-
tect the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties they promote
efficiency and justice. "A very different situation arises, however, when
the law enforces a duty on which the parties did not in fact agree, and
on which they would not have agreed if the question had been posed to
8 Komesar, supra note 2.
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them directly."9
On one level, such suggestions seem unobjectionable. Contract law
has commonly been cast in terms of the expectations of the parties.
However, even assuming that contract law in general, and landlord-ten-
ant law in particular, should be focused solely on the parties' expecta-
tions and further that this focus is related to a basic concern for the
efficient allocations of resources, the conclusions one can draw about the
evolution of landlord-tenant law are more complex than Professor Ra-
bin indicates. A wide range of alternative means of determining expec-
tations and enforcing contracts is involved here, and the relative merits
of these means depend on a range of unspoken assumptions about the
market, the courts, and even the political process.
When Judge Wright declared inJavins v. First National Realty Corp. 10
that a warranty of habitability would be measured by the housing code
and that the warranty could not be waived, he ventured further than
any judge in the area. Cases like Lemle v. Breeden, 1 Pines v. Perssion, 12 and
Marini v. Ireland'3 can be seen as part of a more gradual evolution rather
than a revolution in landlord-tenant law. At least the first two reached
results that were consistent with traditional doctrines-albeit written
with a great deal of broad language. The courts in Lemle and Pines pre-
sumably would have respected a knowing waiver and perhaps the Lemle
court would have been more respectful of standards deviating from the
housing code. Is Judge Wright's approach obviously less efficient than
these other observable alternatives? In turn, are any of these modern
approaches obviously superior to the traditional (pre-evolution) rules,
under which the parties' expectations were determined from the agree-
ment's express provisions only?
Evaluating which of these approaches is the most consistent with
efficient resource allocation (or distribution or some other measure of
justice) depends on assumptions about the abilities of several institutions
to determine expectations and the value of resources. Consider first the
traditional (pre-evolution) rules. If we assume that the market is
strongly competitive and that the parties are both well aware of what
they want and sophisticated, why should judges even determine what
the parties might have decided if confronted by a question posed to
them directly? Judges are isolated from the particulars of leasing trans-
actions and are informed only by an ex post adversary process. Under
these circumstances, guesses by judges under the aegis of "implication"
may well more often deviate from the expectations of the parties and be
9 Rabin, supra note 1, at 580.
10 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
11 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
12 14 Wis. 2d 520, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
13 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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less efficient than a rigid requirement of clear writings and minimal ju-
dicial determination.
One can blunt the force of this argument by altering these assump-
tions about the market or by a greater faith in the legal process. That is
my point. Professor Rabin's seemingly straightforward adherence to en-
forcement of implied terms, which theoretically represent the intent of
the parties, is not so straightforward. It depends upon the relative abili-
ties of two admittedly imperfect institutional modes of valuation-the
courts and the market.
Suppose we now consider the efficiency of employing housing codes
as the source of implication of reasonable expectations, but with the
ability to waive by express terms. This is essentially the Pines position.
Is this superior to the Lemle position of broad based implication? The
answer lies mainly in one's perception of the relative merits of the judici-
ary versus the legislature. I have already noted some of the constraints
on a judiciary informed by an adversary process in determining what a
given tenant or landlord might have reasonably expected. One might
argue that the legislature, with its greater leeway in factfinding, is supe-
rior to the judiciary in its ability to determine reasonable expectations.
Although one might see relative advantages in a legislative determi-
nation, questions also arise about this institution. First, there are issues
surrounding the political process. If all results were the product of a
simple majority vote, there would be obvious sources of deviation from
ideal allocative determinations. Votes and intensity of preference do
not necessarily correlate. When one introduces the representative polit-
ical process, bureaucracy, and the presence of concentrated interests, the
possibilities for inefficient results increase. These are issues I will raise in
the second part of this commentary. Even if there are no deviations and
the political actors have the incentive to seek the efficient solution, a
general legislative determination or standard has some disadvantages
relative to case-by-case judicial determination.
Ultimately, deciding whether a housing code, replete with special
interest provisions and general maxims, is superior to an adversarial ju-
dicial process or to formal market transactions between less than fully
knowledgeable or sophisticated parties is a difficult task. Nevertheless
that is the question we must face.
Next, consider the refusal to allow waiver of the code standards,
which is, to me, the core of theJavins decision. Is such a requirement
"efficient" as compared to the requirement of explicit provisions, the
enforcement of clauses implied from the circumstances of the individual
transaction, or the enforcement of clauses implied from the housing code
with waiver available? It is easy enough to make the argument that it is
not. But it is not difficult to spell out the counterargument as well.
Many tenants lack the knowledge and sophistication to realize the
[Vol. 69:612
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implications of their waiver of housing code standards and courts are
often unable to identify which tenants actually had such problems. Ar-
guably, under these conditions, theJavins solution might be superior to
the other real-world alternatives. In fact, the potential for consideration
of institutional features can be extended beyond concern about the
characteristics of tenants. Housing codes represent a societal response to
the external effects of the deterioration of one building upon others in
the neighborhood. To the extent that bureaucratic code enforcement is
an imperfect mechanism, code enforcement through the judicially en-
forced landlord-tenant law might yield efficiency gains.
In this vein we can consider Professor Rabin's approval of the
courts' refusal to enforce exculpatory clauses. He finds this acceptable
because tenants have little opportunity to shop for variation in lease
terms. 14 But this argument barely scratches the surface. Form leases
provide information to tenants and increase the chances that tenants
have had experience with similar exculpatory clauses. If these clauses
were not cost justified, we might well expect that market forces would
remove them from form leases over time. It is probably a more damning
critique of the market here to suggest that these exculpatory clauses deal
with events that are infrequent albeit quite injurious. As such, one may
argue that a tenant would have less knowledge and sophistication about
the implications of such exculpatory clauses than he or she would have
about the implications of waiving rights to varying levels of quality or
habitability.
It is always possible to find market imperfections and often possible
to identify gradations of these imperfections. But market imperfections
taken alone tell us little about whether a legal rule refusing to enforce
exculpatory clauses is efficient or just. Thus, the torts system is hardly
perfect and the costs of dealing with it can form a sensible basis for an
arrangement to avoid litigation. In addition, one can view more litig-
ious people as imposing costs on the less litigious if the latter are not
allowed to manifest their desires in the form of devices like exculpatory
clauses.
As a general matter, variation in institutional attributes and com-
parison of institutions must dominate analysis of landlord-tenant law.
The degree of market imperfection is useful but hardly determinative.
There must be at least one other decisionmaking mechanism considered
in our examples-the judiciary. The parallel attributes of that mecha-
nism in the relevant context must be integrated into the analysis. In-
deed, there are often a number of institutional or decisionmaking
alternatives among and within the judiciary and the political process. A
theoretical analysis of these landlord-tenant laws is not valuable unless
14 Rabin, supra note 1, at 582-83.
1984]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the analysis recognizes these institutional variations, or at least assumes
they do not exist. The theory then is only as good as these assump-
tions-or the empirical testing of the results.
Thus far, I have focused on the institutional issues associated with
the societal goal of resource allocation efficiency. I will also briefly con-
sider the comparative institutional elements of the distributional goal.
The question is whether the enforcement of code standards through un-
waivable implied warranties of habitability is the best means of achiev-
ing a redistribution from rich landlords to poor tenants. I take this goal
as an important feature of Judge Wright's objectives inJavins and an
element underlying the Ackerman proposal.
There are certain evident features to any analysis that begins at this
point. To the extent that the tenants receive something without paying
the full cost, they receive a redistribution in kind rather than cash and
arguably may not value this in-kind element to the extent to which their
rents have risen. It is therefore possible that the incidence of the cost
falls to some degree on the landlords even though the tenants also suffer
a detrimental redistribution. There certainly could be a negative sum
outcome.
It is more interesting, however, to examine the implications of an
outcome that is to some degree favorable to tenants as a whole. One
might ask which tenants would receive the greatest benefit. The answer
may lie in the particulars of the legal process as well as the political
process. Professor Rabin points to the potential reduction of govern-
ment subsidy for rental payments. In addition, one might consider
changes in governmental or voluntary sector provision of free or subsi-
dized legal services. To the extent that legal services are less available or
available only at higher costs to the low income tenant, the redistribu-
tive impact of theJavins remedy on the poorer tenant may be considera-
bly less attractive. As a general matter, the legal process has the
potential for significant nonegalitarian, income-regressive elements.
The sophistication necessary to employ the system can be seen as
strongly related to the number and the size of transactions. The costs of
pursuing awards (lawyers, investigators, court reporters, etc.) do not re-
late proportionally to the size of the stakes.
There is a conventional economist's response to those who would
argue that redistribution through a judicially created contract remedy
likeJavins is superior. If redistribution is desirable, it should be carried
forward by a broad based public sector response that taxes the rich and
gives to the poor. In its simplest form, this program is envisioned as cash
transfers--a negative income tax, perhaps.
But this program is an idealized response and it is always treacher-
ous to compare an imperfect judicial outcome with an ideal political
one. It is necessary to recognize the imperfections in the political mech-
[Vol. 69:612
anism as well. However one imagines social desirability-utilitarian,
wealth maximization, egalitarian, contractarian-the political process is
hardly a perfect mode of achieving it. Often the same economists who
criticize hodge-podge, in-kind judicial redistribution, such as that at-
tempted injavins, in favor of the cleaner redistribution of a straightfor-
ward cash transfer are quick to note that the political process has severe
problems as a mode of manifesting public will. The economic theory of
regulation associated with George Stigler is one of several economic
treatments that view the political process as something less than an ideal
reflection of social desirability.15 It is essential to compare the judiciary
with the political process as a mode of determining and manifesting so-
cially desirable income redistribution or other social policy. In fact, I
would suggest that it is an intrinsic part of any analysis of the law associ-
ated with the Constitution 16 and even with nonconstitutional statutory
interpretation.1 7 The relative abilities and attributes of the judiciary
and the political process are essential and largely ignored features of a
great deal of the law and can claim a central role in any legal analysis,
whether descriptive or prescriptive. Perhaps careful analysis may often
prefer the imperfect political process to the imperfect judiciary. But
that largely remains to be seen.
II
THE POLITICS OF RENT CONTROL
I will now proceed from Professor Rabin's evaluation of features of
the landlord-tenant revolution to a section in which he offers an expla-
nation for the political outcome of rent control.18 Professor Rabin
searches for an explanation for the political popularity of a program
that most economists argue will harm tenants more than it helps them.
Landlords are not supporters of rent control, so where does the political
support come from? Why would tenants vote for a program that would
harm them? One answer may be that tenants misconceive the effect of
rent control, believing that when rents are forced down, landlords will
bear the costs and that the supply of housing will not change. Professor
Rabin, however, seeks a more "economic" explanation-one founded in
informed self-interest rather than in ignorance. He suggests that those
tenants who vote are benefited and it is other tenants not well repre-
sented in the political process who are disadvantaged. He identifies ten-
ant gains with the short run or with those tenants who will not change
15 This theory will be considered at greater length subsequently. See infra text accompa-
nying note 19.
16 Komesar, supra note 3.
17 G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Komesar, supra
note 2, at 1375-81.
18 Rabin, supra note 1, at 558-78.
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their living arrangements in the long run. Those tenants harmed in the
long run are either young or not residents of the voting community.
These are people who are not well represented in a local democratic
political process.
Whether Professor Rabin's characterization aptly captures all or
most of the reality of rent control approval, it certainly offers a provoca-
tive and useful picture. More importantly, it is a representation gener-
ated from a given conception or model of the political process. This
conception is not the only plausible one and not the one which underlies
the dominant economic model of regulation. Thus, we can see a range
of institutional assumptions at play and a wide divergence in possible
outcomes.
As Professor Rabin casts rent control politics, there are three basic
interest groups-(1) landlords, (2) present tenants, and (3) prospective
tenants. If each voted their interests, the landlords and prospective ten-
ants would oppose rent control, and present tenants would favor the
laws. Because prospective tenants do not vote, however, their interests
are not considered and the more numerous present tenants prevail over
the less numerous landlords.
This simple majority voting model, however, does not characterize
the most prominent economic analysis of governmental regulation.
Here I refer to the Stigler model. Professor Stigler has suggested that
economic regulation may often serve the purposes of those regulated by
providing controls on competition and redistribution to producers, often
at the expense of consumers.19 Presumably, the consumers adversely af-
fected by such regulations outnumber the producers who would profit
from the regulations. Professor Stigler's analysis is based on a more com-
plex model of the political process. The producers, whose interests are
far more concentrated, are able to organize efforts to affect the political
process better than the far more dispersed consumers. One may envi-
sion a political process characterized by political representatives whose
self-interests lie with the more organized interests. Such a result may be
consistent with a simple graft model. The better organized group can
pool funds and negotiate a bribe with far greater ease than the dispersed
group even though the dispersed group would in theory have a greater
aggregated interest and therefore a larger potential bribe.
Although the simple graft model represents an extreme, one could
envision a more moderate example of honest but ignorant representa-
tives interested only in the public good, but in need of guidance. The
lobbying and other informational activities of the concentrated interests
may be far more effective than the efforts of the dispersed group because
they are better organized. In turn, one might conceive a politician in-
19 Stigler, The Theog of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
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terested in reelection and aware that the populace may be less than fully
informed. Such a politician may be swayed by concentrated interests
who can promise campaign contributions or threaten large scale efforts
to convince the public that any politician who opposes them also op-
poses the interest of the populace.
Professor Stigler's model of political behavior puts great emphasis
on the organizational advantages of a concentrated group. In the local
rent control setting, there is some tension between the Stigler model and
the actual results. The most concentrated interest should be the land-
lord group. It is smaller and the per capita impact of the legislation
should be highest for this group. The position of this group, however,
does not prevail. Instead, the present tenants-a less concentrated
group-prevail.
This tension between models of the political process does not indi-
cate that either is wrong. Rather it indicates some incompleteness in all
of them. As a general matter, Professor Stigler deals with regulation at
the federal level and envisions two groups that can have great differ-
ences in concentration of interest-producers and consumers. The con-
sumer group has such a low per capita interest (despite its large
aggregate interest) that it may not be worthwhile for any consumer even
to become aware of legislation affecting that interest. As the less concen-
trated consumer group becomes smaller and its per capita interest be-
comes larger, however, the possibility of awareness and the possibility of
organization become greater. Consumers may still be less effectively or-
ganized than their opponents, but they retain their advantage in
number of votes. It is the combination of these qualities that may make
the less concentrated group more effective politically.
There is a spectrum of political outcomes that ranges between the
power of the vote and the power of organization.20 The likely outcome
and any deviation from an ideal solution depends on the context. This
again suggests that institutional features and variation in institutional
efficacy and choice are complex and highly significant. Analysis of the
law-whether descriptive or prescriptive-would profit from closer at-
tention to these features.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to sketch some important institutional issues that
should underlie any attempt to evaluate the landlord-tenant revolution.
The points I have made here need expansion. They require better tools
of institutional analysis than those that are immediately at hand. It is
20 See Komesar, Housing, Zoning and the Pub/ic Interest, in B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N.
KOMESAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW-AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218
(1978).
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my opinion that economic analysis has the potential to aid in the build-
ing of institutional analysis for nonmarket institutions. Such attempts
have already been made for the political process.
More importantly, effective legal analysis will require a careful
comparison of institutional capabilities in real-world contexts. General-
izations about institutional advantage are necessary, but treacherous. It
will take more than broad maxims to effectively evaluate and describe
the institutional factors that underlie changes in legal doctrine. It will
take some sense of the texture of the law-an exposure to the law and
legal institutions. This seems the place for experienced lawyers sophisti-
cated enough to borrow useful insights from economics (and other rele-
vant disciplines).
Professor Rabin is a sophisticated lawyer with a bent for economic
analysis. As he expands upon the themes he has presented in the ambi-
tious article discussed here, I hope he will turn more attention to the
central issues of institutional comparison.
